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 Research aim 
 
The story of the Second World War has been told from many viewpoints in the 
Hungarian special literature. However, these writings mostly point out the events that 
happened in 1942, or the following years. They especially emphasize the deployment of 
the 2nd Hungarian Army in 1942/43, and also the battles in that took place in Hungary in 
1944-45. Obviously, this is because these are the most significant and spectacular 
Hungarian participations in the war, and these are the well-known topics. It is 
remarkable, that these topics were highlighted also in the socialist era, even though in a 
different context. The defeat at Don is portrayed as the biggest tragedy in the Hungarian 
military since Mohacs in 1526, and of course it was used as a reason to criticize the 
Horthy administration. Another reason for highlighting these events was the Red Army’s 
liberating operations during 1944-45. Still, numerous subtopics have remained 
undiscovered. I consider the question of the Army’s mobile branch is one of this kind.  
This subject is not only interesting because of the historical point of view. The 
speed, the quick reaction and the logistical connections between these are all very 
important aspects in modern day’s military. In a military action, the theory of “to the 
right place at the right time” is just as important as the size and strength of the deployed 
forces. Another question of current concern is the coalition warfare that is important to 
point out with its historical proofs. 
The role of the Hungarian Royal Army in the Second World War can not be 
interpreted without analyzing all the events preceding it. This is true for my chosen topic 
as well.  
My aims are: 
- To introduce and evaluate the Hungarian Royal Army’s newest and most modern 
branch of arms and its functions  
- To introduce and evaluate the experiences that were gained during the deployment, and 
the conclusions that were drawn back then 
- To complete and refine the image that is portrayed about the Army – this image only 
points out the out-of-date, conservative characteristics of the Army’s mentality and 
material conditions. I would like to set a contrast with this image and the actual 
organizational and theoretical progress that they have reached.  
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- To illustrate the theoretical and practical efforts that were taken in order to create a 
modern branch of arms. 
- To prove that in Hungary, the changes of the military theories were followed with 
attention. 
The present dissertation is not going to discuss the armament and military technology 
of the motorized brigades in details. Neither military technology and apparatus, nor technical 
background of development will be analyzed rigorously, only their most important features 
will be described. The thesis will indeed briefly summarize the chronology and foreign policy 
in order to make the events of warfare comprehensible. 
 
 
Research Methods 
 
The methods that I used were influenced by my research objectives. There are plenty 
of available sources, but most of them deal with the question briefly or they are summaries, or 
their main subject is military techniques. Some sources must be examined with criticism 
because they are bearers of special characteristics of the time they were written.  Throughout 
my research, I processed the available primary and secondary sources by using the methods of 
analysis and synthesis.  
Researchers who aim to examine the early history of Hungarian motorized brigades 
between 1938 and 1941 will encounter several difficulties. First of all, Hungarian 
historiography still wants monographs in this topic; therefore composite works have to be 
consulted for extracting the necessary information. Works and monographs covering the 
history of the Royal Hungarian Army mainly concentrate on the period from 1941 to 1945, 
and the pre-1941 era is referred to concisely. 
 Although there are some secondary sources that deal with the period mentioned above, 
they usually intend to analyse a subtopic. Despite of being quality works, they can be seen as 
textbooks or pieces of popular science, rather than academic essays. In addition, there are no 
comprehensive studies on the history of contemporary weapons used by the Royal Hungarian 
Army. However, in the examination of motorized brigades the histories of separate units, that 
constituted a popular genre of Hungarian historiography in the past and reappeared after the 
political transition in 1989, play a more significant role. The recent works on unit history 
enable to get a more detailed picture of armoured vehicles. 
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The lack of primary sources probably accounts for the deficiency in historiography, as 
the majority of the archives were lost in the World War II. Since the records concerning 
military operations were also destroyed, the investigation gets even more difficult. The 
surviving material is currently stored in the Military Archives, of which the documents 
produced by the chief of general staff of the Royal Hungarian Army are extremely valuable. 
Unfortunately, these files were preserved partially, and they are now classified into the first 
main group of fonds. 
The 3b section of the Ministry of Defence was responsible for armoured and other 
military vehicles, so its official papers can be the source of collecting financial and technical 
data. 
The registers of the Royal Hungarian Army and the Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie, 
which belong to the second main group of fonds (regional authorities, units), were seriously 
damaged as well. The extant records of army corps and other divisions, documents of military 
leadership of both higher and lower ranks are also very limited in number. 
For interpretation of military operations some specific sources, the recommendations 
for military awards and decorations can be a useful help. These documents described the war 
accomplishments or the feat of arms as an explanation for the proposal, and in this way they 
contribute to the reconstruction of military events which would be otherwise complicated in 
the absence of military bulletins and unit records. 
As supplements of the investigation, personal data of army officers can be added from 
the Officers’ Identity and Birth Certificates, Army History Sheets fond (“Tiszti személyügyi 
és anyakönyvi lapok, minősítési táblázatok”) of the first main group of fonds. 
The memoirs of war witnesses are conserved in the Studies Collection 
(“Tanulmánygyűjtemény”) fond of the seventh main group of fonds. Despite the subjectivity 
of these accounts, they provide the researchers with useful pieces of additional information. 
The issues of the monthly journal “Magyar Katonai Szemle” published between 1931 
and 1944 were of primary importance in course of the research. The articles, reports and war 
stories released in the Szemle reflect the contemporary viewpoints of Hungarian military 
personnel. Furthermore, descriptions of different weapon types and the situation of armed 
units were included in the publications as well. 
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Description of Survey 
 
Besides the Introduction and Conclusion, the paper has three main chapters. In the first 
chapter, I describe the circumstances and military trends that determined and influenced 
the birth and evolution of the new branch of arms. Here, I review the international and 
national tendencies and events that preceded the transformation of the army in 1938. I 
tend to introduce that the Hungarian innovations were carried out based on a thorough 
theoretical background and knowing all the foreign tendencies. 
 
The following two main chapters (4 subchapters) will explain how the theories were 
turned into practice through the deployment of the mobile forces, and what conclusions 
can be drawn from these operations.  
 
The parts about the occupation of Felvidék and Northern Transylvania are shorter on 
purpose, than the parts introducing the operations in Kárpátalja and Délvidék. This is 
because only the latter mentioned locations gave place to concrete military actions, 
while to the North and the East, they made successes by using the tools of diplomacy. 
However, during these actions to Kárpátalja and Délvidék, the participation of the 
Hungarian forces was rather limited. At Kárpátalja, the opposing forces –or perhaps the 
lack of them –, were the ones who saved the Hungarian forces from a bloody battle, 
while at Délvidék, it was the German army and their successes that helped out the 
Hungarians. 
 
In the chapter entitled The Occupation of Felvidék, I introduce the mobile formations in 
their first stages. This is especially true for the Second Motorized Brigade, whose formation 
was just in progress. In Kárpátalja, the mobile forces were already in combat environment. 
The units without any established human and material conditions were doing well in these 
limited war circumstances. The experiences after the march-in had shown though, that 
they need some serious improvements. One important experience is that the mobile 
strategic formation needs a unified leadership. This brought the Mobile Army Corps into 
existence.  
 
The reoccupation of Northern Transylvania proved and helped the military leadership to 
realize that the Mobile Army Corps is not ready yet to fulfill most of the tasks that were 
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meant for them. The experiences during the action and - if a Hungarian-Romanian war 
occurs -, the potentials of the Romanian Army showed, that the mobile forces are still 
not armed sufficiently and they are far from being able to complete the tasks determined 
by the Field Manual.  
 
I reveal the conditions of the deployment in details in the chapter titled Operation at 
Délvidék. I delineate the forces of the opposing armies, the geographical conditions and 
their war plans. Based on this, I will locate the operations of the Mobile Army Corps 
and prove that the mobile forces, with their current organization, equipment and training 
are still deployable only in a limited way, compared to their requirements. There are 
serious lacks in basic parameters which have not been repaired yet (proved by previous 
experiences).  
 
 
Summary – A general overview about the actions of the mobile forces 
 
The Hungarian Royal army had realized soon that between the two world wars there was 
a new military theory created that could actually be useful. In the 30s, there were 
already theories that served as the basis of the deployment of the new branches of arms 
in the 2nd World War. The reason for the basic changes was the motorization and the 
military changes that came up with it. 1 By end of the decade, the armor, automobile and 
aircraft techniques have developed enough to put these theories into practice more 
generally. There were many factors hindering Hungary’s armament. One of them was 
that the country was bound by the Treaty of Trianon. Furthermore, the economic and 
personal background was unsatisfactory. By the end of the 30s, these factors began to 
take a positive turn, and in 1938, a vast armament program had began. This is how the 
mobile branch was formed. This new branch of arms was dealing with all the growing 
pains that the newly reorganized Army also had, and due to its characteristics, it had 
other problems as well.  
 
                                                 
1 Obviously, we can also list several other outstanding results of other fields (electronics, broadcasting, chemical 
industry, mining, etc.), but the key for innovation is definitely the appearance and spread of a new source of 
energy. 
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The mobile forces that had been set up in 1938, first got deployed during the occupation 
of Felvidék. The actions of these barely organized formations only slightly exceeded the 
level of an army exercise. However, while recapturing Kárpátalja, there were concrete 
military actions. The forces did not have the optimal organizational, human and material 
conditions, and they did not even get the chance to be deployed accordingly to the 
modern tactical theories either.  Even though the units of recruits were doing well, it was 
still in doubt whether they can carry through the planned operations in case of organized 
resistance. Their training and their material supplies were not satisfactory either.  
 
Based on the experiences, the creation of the Mobile Army Corps in order to command 
the mobile strategic formations did not only mean an organized and professional 
leadership in a possible operation, but it also served as a peacetime commander and a 
head of the trainings as well. This made it possible to create and apply the required and 
unified principles, and also to prepare the commanders to lead the army based on these 
new rules. It became clear, that a new branch of arms can not be maintained for “ad hoc” 
situations. They have to set up the mobile forces already in peacetime with strong 
material and human conditions. From this point, they started to unify the motorized 
forces of the groups – rather unsuccessfully, especially in case of the civil vehicles –, 
and started to provide the armored units much more modern army vehicles than the 
previous ones. (Csaba armored car, Toldi light tank, Nimród antitank vehicle, Turán 
medium tank).  
 
At the time of the Hungarian-Romanian “almost-war” in 1940, the Hungarian strategy 
was ready to fulfill the orders of the Mobile Army Corps’s Regulation. After breaking 
through the Romanian defense, the mobile formations were supposed to act in the depth 
of the Romanian defense. The war did not happen, and the only thing the groups had to 
fight with was a peaceful march-in, same as it went in Felvidék. Here, the enemy was 
not really the Romanian force, but the big march distances and circumstances. The 
mobile units, that were presenting much more significant marches than some other 
groups, still had to deal with numerous problems, that would have influenced badly their 
efficiency in war circumstances. The supplementary shipment had often got left behind, 
and the signal unit network was not satisfactory either. The shortage in vehicles and 
horses caused a lot of losses to many formations, without even getting involved into a 
battle.  
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 The German victories meant a lot of important experiences. This could convince the 
doubters, that motorizing means the future for the army, and not the astray. Moreover, 
they also confirmed the deployment theories born before the war. The campaigns to 
Poland and to the West had justified the importance of the armored battalions, but 
because they did not have any war experience on their own, they assigned new ways of 
improvement as well. After this, they started to organize the armored battalions, and to 
improve the armament of the units. However, these ambitions had to fit to the country’s 
potentials. It was obvious, that the Germans served as an example for a lot of reasons, 
but – as a report refers to it – they can not be copied. There are basic differences in the 
German requirements regarding not only the economical, technical and personal 
abilities, but also the army’s possible deployment conditions. 
 
 In April 1941, the Army got deployed again. The campaign to Délvidék was now a coalition 
war, with all the benefits of a powerful alliance. The soldiers did not confront any organized 
opposing forces now either, but had problems dealing with the irregular forces. And, of 
course, the usual problems came up again. The poor supplementary shipment, the untrained 
soldiers, the imperfect material circumstances, the problematic commanding were all 
problems the attacking groups had to deal with. Earlier, diplomacy was the reason for not 
confronting the enemy, but now the reason was that the Hungarian forces did not encounter 
any significant resistance by the time they took off, with the help of the German ground-and 
air forces. Thus, the Army did not get the chance to be tested in war circumstances again, the 
trial did not happen now either. They were not missing the military experiences though, even 
if they were incomplete. But they did not have enough time to solve their problems, because 
after Délvidék, the Mobile Army Corps got deployed again. But this time, they were in a "one 
weak against two strong" situation. Now, they had to pay with blood for their weak 
techniques, for neglecting the developments and cutting back costs for no reasons.  
 
 
New academic results  
 
In my dissertation, I pointed out that the Hungarian military innovators were constantly 
following the international tendencies with attention, and I introduced and evaluated the 
development of the mobile forces. 
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The Hungarian military commanders did not only view the events of the Second World 
War as war-experiences, but they also analyzed them, and while innovating and 
deploying the mobile forces, they always took these experiences into account in a 
modern way.  
I summarized the story of the Hungarian Army’s mobile forces between 1938 and 1941 
based on their deployments and the conclusions that can be drawn from them.  
Alongside with the deployments, I also introduced the ideas and processes of the 
developments. 
As opposed to many labeling statements about the Hungarian Army, we can say that the 
leadership of the Army had reached the current standards of its time. (Despite the 
problems coming up in the material and technical conditions, we can tell that the 
Hungarian mobile forces were representing more modern theories from many respects, 
than other, opposing forces of their level). It had also turned out, that the theoretical 
preparedness was not always supported by practical knowledge.  
 
 
Further research objectives 
 
In the future, I plan to complete my work with a broad overview of the material 
conditions of the mobile forces, especially comparing their characteristics with the 
equipments of the existing and possible enemies. Besides introducing the arms and 
equipments, it would also be important to collect the officers of the groups. Regarding 
each type of groups, it would be necessary to do a more detailed research, focusing on 
their equipment, tactics and human background. 
 
 
Practical usage of the scientific achievements 
 
The dissertation can be used in teaching history in general, helping to refine the 
stereotypical thinking about the mobile forces. It can also have a role in teaching 
military history. It can be useful for the field officers as well. The historical analyses are 
also helpful for the current military leaders. The methods of commanding the operations, 
cooperating with the allies are current and actual questions.  
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